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Abstract—Privacy concerns in the modern digital age have prompted researchers to develop techniques that allow users to selectively
suppress certain information in collected data while allowing for other information to be extracted. In this regard, Semi-Adversarial
Networks (SAN) have recently emerged as a method for imparting soft-biometric privacy to face images. SAN enables modifications of
input face images so that the resulting face images can still be reliably used by arbitrary conventional face matchers for recognition
purposes, while attribute classifiers, such as gender classifiers, are confounded. However, the generalizability of SANs across arbitrary
gender classifiers has remained an open concern. In this work, we propose a new method, FlowSAN, for allowing SANs to generalize
to multiple unseen gender classifiers. We propose combining a diverse set of SAN models to compensate each other’s weaknesses,
thereby, forming a robust model with improved generalization capability. Extensive experiments using different unseen gender
classifiers and face matchers demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed paradigm in imparting gender privacy to face images.
Index Terms—Biometrics, Face Image, Semi-Adversarial Networks, SAN, Gender, Privacy, Adversarial, Deep Learning.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
FACE images of individuals contain valuable informa-tion unique to themselves that facilitates biometric face
recognition. In addition, other auxiliary information such as
age, gender, and race, which are called soft-biometrics, can
also be extracted from face images using machine learn-
ing techniques [1]–[3]. Face recognition involves comparing
features extracted from a pair of face images, using a face
matcher, to determine their degree of similarity [1], [4]. The
increasing use of face recognition in various applications
has brought the issue of data privacy to the forefront [5]–
[18]. While extracting soft-biometric information can be
useful in many applications [19], we should note that such
information can be abused in several ways, such as profiling
users, targeted advertisement, and increasing the risk of
linkage attacks [20]. Furthermore, extracting this informa-
tion without the users’ consent may be viewed as a violation
of their privacy. One aspect of privacy involves granting
users the right to determine which personal information to
reveal and which to conceal [21], [22]. In this regard, soft-
biometric privacy was introduced as a means for preserving
the biometric utility of face images, while confounding soft-
biometric information, such as gender characteristics [23],
[24].
Recently, European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [25] has come to effect. One of its goals
is to protect the data collected from European users and
to regulate its usage. To this effect, it enforces any entity
(individual or group) collecting data from European users
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to disclose the type-of-data collected, the intended usage,
and the data-processing techniques that will be used. Ac-
cordingly, GDPR prohibits any processing of individuals’
information beyond the stated purpose at the time of data
collection. For example, consider a scenario where users
of an application or service can optionally withhold their
gender information; however, such information could still
be extracted automatically from their biometric data [26]–
[34].
In the context of GDPR, biometric data of individuals,
such as face photos or fingerprints, are collected solely for
the purpose of user recognition, without acquiring other
demographic information such as age, gender, and ethnicity.
In such a scenario, applying data processing techniques that
allow extracting such sensitive information automatically
from a person’s biometric data [1], [2], [32], [35]–[40] without
their knowledge and consent is a violation of the users’ pri-
vacy. While GDPR prohibits unsolicited data extraction from
European users, the possibility of unlawful data collection
still remains and can ultimately lead to negative societal,
economic, and political consequences [41]–[43].
Previously, we developed Semi-Adversarial Networks
(SAN) [44] for imparting soft-biometric privacy to face im-
ages, where a face image is modified such that the matching
utility of the modified face image is retained while the
automatic extraction of gender information is confounded.
In our previous work [44], we empirically showed that the
ability to predict gender information, using an unseen gen-
der classifier from outputs of the SAN model, is successfully
diminished. In [45], we defined the generalizability of the
SAN model as its ability to confound arbitrary unseen1
1. The term “unseen” indicates that a certain classifier (or face
matcher) was not used during the training stage. On the contrary, the
term “auxiliary” in this paper refers to the classifier (or face matcher)
that is used during the training phase.
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2gender classifiers. Generalizability is an important property
for real-world privacy applications since the lack thereof
implies that there exists at least one gender classifier that
can still reliably estimate the gender attribute from outputs
of the SAN model and, therefore, jeopardizes the privacy of
users. In order to address the generalizability issue of SAN
models, in this paper, we propose the FlowSAN model, that
progressively degrades the performance of unseen gender
classifiers. Extensive experiments on a variety of indepen-
dent gender classifiers and face image datasets show that
the proposed FlowSAN method (Fig. 1) results in a substan-
tially improved generalization performance compared to
the original SAN method with regard to concealing gender
information while retaining face matching utility.
2 RELATED WORK
With regard to privacy concerns in recent years, a new line
of research has emerged that focuses on methods for impart-
ing soft-biometric privacy to biometric data and face images
in particular [8]–[10], [23], [24], [46]. Othman and Ross [23]
first proposed an approach for mixing input face images
with candidate images of the opposite gender using Active
Shape Model [47]. Subsequently, Mirjalili and Ross [24]
developed a scheme that modifies an input face image using
adversarial perturbations [48] where the performance of a
given gender classifier was confounded while the perfor-
mance of a face matcher was retained. Chhabra et al. [9]
later extended this research by including multiple attribute
classifiers. They applied additive perturbations to face im-
ages to either preserve or suppress certain soft-biometric
attributes [9]. While these proposed schemes successfully
confound a target attribute classifier, they fail to generalize
to unseen attribute classifiers. Thus, soft-biometric attributes
remain susceptible to extraction by unseen classifiers.
In order to derive perturbations that are transferable
to unseen gender classifiers, Mirjalili et al. [44] designed
a convolutional autoencoder that modifies input face im-
ages such that an auxiliary face matcher still retains good
matching performance on the modified output image while
confounding an auxiliary gender classifier. As a result, since
the output of their model is adversarial to one classifier
and not to the other, the architecture is referred to as Semi-
Adversarial Networks (SAN). The SAN model was shown
to be able to derive perturbations that are transferable to
two unseen gender classifiers. In [45], we investigated the
generalizability of SAN models across multiple arbitrary
gender classifiers and formulated an ensemble SAN model
with a training scheme based on different data augmen-
tation techniques, to enhance diversity in the ensemble of
SAN models. Furthermore, we explored the effectiveness of
randomly selecting a perturbed image from an ensemble of
SAN models, which we refer to as Ens-Gibbs [45].
While these methods directly apply perturbations to
face images, recently, new techniques have emerged where
perturbations were applied to face representation vectors
computed by face matchers [8], [13]. In particular, Morales et
al. [8] proposed a neural-network-based model, called Sen-
sitiveNet, that is able to remove soft-biometric information
from face representation vectors. Therefore, any attribute
classifier trained on face representation vectors may not
SAN1Iorig SAN2 SANnI1
‘ I2
‘ In
‘
Original I1 I2 I3 I4 I5
‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘
Gender Prob. 
P(Male):
Matching Acc. 
w/ original:
80%
80%
98%
56%
98%
34% 14% 6%
97% 94% 91%
(A)
(B)
Iorig
Fig. 1. Illustration of the FlowSAN model, which sequentially combines
individual SAN models in order to sequentially perturb a previously
unseen gender classifier, while the performance of an unseen face
matcher is preserved. A: An input gray-scale face image Iorig is passed
to the first SAN model (SAN1) in the ensemble. The output image of
SAN1, I′1, is then passed to the second SAN model in the ensemble,
SAN2, and so forth. B: An unmodified face image from the CelebA [49]
dataset (Iorig) and the perturbed variants I′i after passing it through
the different SAN models sequentially. The gender prediction results
measured as probability of being male (P (Male)) as well as the face
match score between the original (Iorig) and the perturbed images (I′i)
are shown.
be able to extract such sensitive information. However,
these methods are based on the assumption that only face
representation vectors are stored in a biometric database.
This scheme is not desirable in many applications since
only storing face representations results in 1) losing human
interpretability, and 2) losing backward matching compat-
ibility when the face matcher is updated. An overview
of existing techniques and their properties (transferability,
generalization to arbitrary attribute classifiers, and retaining
matching utility) is shown in Table 1.
In this work, we address the generalization issue of the
SAN method using a novel stacking paradigm that will
successively enhance the perturbations for confounding an
arbitrary unseen gender classifier as illustrated in Fig. 1. We
refer to this method as FlowSAN. The primary contributions
of this work are as follows:
• Designing the FlowSAN model that can successively
degrade the performance of arbitrary unseen gender
classifiers;
• Generalizing the FlowSAN model to multiple arbi-
trary gender classifiers;
• Demonstrating the practicality and efficacy of the
proposed approach in confounding the gender in-
formation for real-world privacy applications via
extensive experiments involving broad and diverse
sets of datasets.
3 PROPOSED METHOD
Original SAN model [44]: The SAN model for imparting
gender privacy to face images was first proposed in [44],
and the overall architecture is shown in Fig. 2. The SAN
model leverages pre-computed face prototypes, which are
average face images for each gender. SAN consists of three
subnetworks: 1) a convolutional autoencoder that perturbs
an input face image via face prototypes, 2) an auxiliary face
3TABLE 1
Overview of existing methods for imparting soft-biometric privacy and their comparison based on three criteria: transferability, generalizability, and
retention of matching performance; transferability refers to the ability to generate perturbations that can successfully confound a different gender
classifier, whereas generalizability is a stronger criterion for the ability to confound any arbitrary unseen gender classifier.
Authors Domain Proposed Method Transferable Generalizable Matching Performance
Othman and Ross [23] Face images Mixing faces of opposite gender Yes Yes Severely degraded
Sim and Li [10] Face images Multimodal Discriminant Analysis Yes Yes Severely degraded
Mirjalili et al. [24] Face images Adversarial perturbations No No Mostly retained
Mirjalili et al. [44] Face images Semi-Adversarial Networks Yes No Mostly retained
Chhabra et al. [9] Face images Adversarial perturbations No No Mostly retained
Mirjalili et al. [45] Face images Ensemble of SAN models Yes Yes Mostly retained
Morales et al. [8] Face representations SensitiveNet Yes Yes Mostly retained
Terho¨rst et al. [13] Face representations Noise transformation Yes Yes Mostly retained
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the original SAN model [44] composed of three
subnetworks: I: a convolutional autoencoder [50], II: an auxiliary face
matcher (M ), and III: an auxiliary gender classifier (G). In addition, the
unit D computes the pixelwise dissimilarity between input and perturbed
images during model training.
matcher, which is a convolutional neural network (CNN),
and 3) a CNN-based auxiliary gender classifier. The input
to the convolutional autoencoder is a gray-scale2 face image
Iorig, of size 224×224×1, fused with a face prototype belong-
ing to the same gender (Psm). After the fused input image
was passed through the encoder and decoder networks, the
face prototypes (Psm prototype face image from the same
gender as input image, or Pop the prototype face image of
the opposite gender) are added as additional channels to the
resulting 128-channel feature-map representation. Finally, a
1×1-convolutional operation is used to reduce the number
of channels in the resulting feature-maps to a 224×224×1-
dimensional output image, which is denoted as I ′sm or I
′
op,
depending on the type of prototype used by the decoder:
I ′sm = SAN(Iorig;Psm), and
I ′op = SAN(Iorig;Pop).
(1)
These output images, I ′sm and I
′
op, are then passed to
both the auxiliary face matcher and the auxiliary gender
classifier. The auxiliary face matcher predicts whether the
original and the perturbed face images belong to the same
individual via a face match score. The gender classifier
predicts the gender of the input and output images via
gender probabilities for male and female.3 For the auxiliary
face matcher, the pre-trained, publicly available VGG-face
2. Since most face-matchers work with gray-scale face images, we
used gray-scale images in all experiments to allow for a fair comparison
between matchers based on the same input data.
3. In this paper, we have assumed binary labels for gender; however,
it must be noted that societal and personal interpretation of gender can
result in many more classes.
model [51] is used, which computes the face representation
vectors for an input face image, and the similarity between
two face representation vectors determines the associated
match-score.
Three different loss functions are defined based on the
outputs from the autoencoder, the auxiliary gender classi-
fier, and the auxiliary face matcher. The first component of
the loss function, JD , measures the pixelwise dissimilarity
between the input and the output from the same-gender
prototype I ′sm, which is used to ensure that the autoencoder
subnetwork is able to construct realistic face images:
JD(Iorig, I ′sm) =
1
h×w
h×w∑
i=1
H(I(i)orig, I ′(i)sm ), (2)
where H indicates the cross-entropy function for the binary
case, defined as
H(p, q) = − (p log(q) + (1− p) log(1− q)) . (3)
The second loss term, JM , is the squared L2 distance
between the face representation vectors obtained from the
auxiliary face matcher (VGG-face network [51]) for the input
image and the perturbed output, making the autoencoder
learn how to perturb face images such that the accuracy of
the face matcher is retained:
JM (Iorig, I ′op) = ‖RM (Iorig)−RM (I ′op)‖22, (4)
where RM (I) and RM (I ′op) indicate the face representation
vectors for the input image and the perturbed output based
on the opposite-gender prototype.
Finally, the third loss term, JG, is the cross-entropy loss
function applied to the gender probabilities computed by
the auxiliary gender classifier, G, on the two perturbed
output images. Here, the ground-truth label y of the input
image is used for I ′sm, but the reverse (1− y) is used for I ′op:
JG(y, I ′sm, I ′op) = H(y,G(I ′(k)sm )) +H(1− y,G(I ′(k)op )). (5)
The total loss, Jtot, is the weighted sum of the three indi-
vidual loss functions described in the previous paragraphs,
Jtot = λ1JD + λ2JM + λ3JG, (6)
where the parameters λi are the relative weighting terms
that can be chosen uniformly or adjusted via hyperparame-
ter optimization.
In the remaining part of the paper, we use notation I ′ for
the output of a SAN model on a face image Iorig when using
the opposite-gender prototype, i.e., I ′ = SAN(Iorig;Pop).
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Fig. 3. Illustration of an ensemble SAN, where individual SAN models
are trained independent of each other using n diverse, pre-trained, aux-
iliary gender classifiers (G = {G1, G2, ..., Gn}), and a face matcher M
that computes face representation vectors for both input face image Iorig
and the output of the SAN model. D refers to a module that computes
pixelwise dissimilarity between an input and output face image.
Based on our previous study [45], we employed a data
augmentation and resampling scheme for training the aux-
iliary gender classifiers as a means to diversify the SAN
models. In particular, by resampling the instances belonging
to the underrepresented race in the CelebA [49] dataset,
we aimed to balance the racial distribution in the training
data. In this regard, we generated five resampled training
datasets, where in each one a random disjoint subset of
samples from the underrepresented race was replicated 40
times. This is an effort to enhance the diversity among the
SAN models in an ensemble. The resampling approaches
that are used to mitigate the imbalances in the different
training datasets employed in this study are described
in [45].
3.1 Training and Evaluation of an Ensemble SAN model
In our previous work [45], we proposed an ensemble ap-
proach for generalizing SAN models to unseen gender
classifiers. The objective of an ensemble SAN was to create
n SAN models such that their union can span a larger
subset of the hypothesis space compared to a single SAN
model. Therefore, for a new test image and an arbitrary
unseen gender classifier, G, it is likely that at least one
of these SAN models in the ensemble is able to confound
G. For training an ensemble of SANs, we start with n
auxiliary gender classifiers, G = {G1, G2, ..., Gn}, which
were trained using different data augmentation schemes
(to achieve higher diversity among classifiers), and a pre-
trained face matcher M . Then, we train n SAN models,
SAN1
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Fig. 4. Two approaches for evaluating an ensemble of SAN models:
Combining a set of n SAN models trained in the ensemble by (A) av-
eraging n output images, and (B) randomly selecting an output (Gibbs).
where SANi is associated with the auxiliary gender classifier
Gi, as shown in Fig. 3. According to the original SAN model
proposed in [44], the loss function for training each model
is composed of three components: gender loss, matching
loss, and pixelwise dissimilarity loss (Eq. 6). Note that the
ensemble of SAN models described with this setting can be
trained in parallel since each SAN model is independent of
others, and each individual SAN model takes unmodified
images as input (Fig. 3).
Evaluation of an ensemble of models, that were trained
independently, can be performed in two ways:
1) Averaging: Evaluating the ensemble of SANs by
computing the average output image from the set
of n outputs as shown in Fig. 4-A.
2) Gibbs: Randomly selecting the output of one SAN
model (Fig. 4-B).
These two ensemble-based methods serve as a basis for the
comparison with the proposed FlowSAN method, which is
described in the following section.
3.2 FlowSAN: Connecting Multiple SAN Models
Assume there exists a large set of gender classifiers G =
{G1, G2, ..., Gg}, where each Gi(I) predicts the probability
that a face image I belongs to a male individual. Fur-
thermore, suppose there exists a set of m face-matchers
denoted byM = {M1,M2, ...,Mm}, where each Mi(Ia, Ib)
computes the match score between a pair of face images,
Ia and Ib. Our goal is to design an ensemble of n SAN
models, E = 〈S1, S2, ..., Sn〉, that, once they are sequentially
stacked together, can be shown to generalize to confound
unseen gender classifiers in G. We hypothesize that stacking
5diverse SANs sequentially would have a cumulative effect,
where each SAN adds perturbations to an input image that
confound a particular gender classifier. Therefore, stack-
ing SANs would enhance their generalizability in terms
of decreasing the performance of multiple, diverse gender
classifiers.
We define a recursive function ΨE(Iorig, t) for stacking
SAN models in E = {SAN1, ..., SANn}, as follows:
ΨE(Iorig, t) =
{
SAN1(Iorig) if t = 1,
SANt
(
ΨE(Iorig, t− 1)
)
otherwise.
(7)
By varying t from 1 to n, ΨE(Iorig, t) produces a sequence of
n output images 〈I ′1, I ′2, ..., I ′n〉:
• t = 1→ I ′1 = ΨE(Iorig, 1) = SAN1(Iorig),
• t = 2→ I ′2 = ΨE(Iorig, 2) = SAN2
(
SAN1(Iorig)
)
,
• ...
• t = n → I ′n = ΨE(Iorig, n) =
SANn
(
... SAN1(Iorig)
)
.
In particular, we hypothesize that for each Gi ∈ G, the
stacking of SAN models will progressively confound Gi.
Since the individual SAN models were trained to have a
minimal impact on face matching performance, we further
hypothesize that the perturbations introduced in the output
face images 〈I ′1, ..., I ′n〉 from the stacked SAN models should
not substantially affect the face recognition performance of
the matchers inM.
Training Procedure for the FlowSAN Model
The goal of this work is to develop a model that leverages
the image perturbations induced by individual, diverse
SAN models to broaden the spectrum of diverse gender
classifiers that can successfully be confounded. To accom-
plish this goal, we designed and evaluated the FlowSAN
model, where multiple individually-trained SAN models
were sequentially combined.
This section describes the training procedure for the
FlowSAN model, where SAN models i = 1, ..., n are
trained in sequential order, each with their corresponding
auxiliary gender classifier and an auxiliary face matcher,
which is common among all SANs. The first SAN model,
SAN1 ∈ E = {SAN1, ..., SANn}, takes the original image as
input and generates a perturbed output, I ′1, while using the
auxiliary gender classifier G1 during its training. Then, once
SAN1 is trained, the entire training dataset is transformed
by SAN1, and the transformed data is then used for training
the next SAN model while using its corresponding auxiliary
gender classifier. This process is repeated for SAN models
i = 1, ..., n, to obtain n SAN models that are trained in
sequential order. Note that the matching loss is computed
between face representation vectors (generated by a face
matcher) of the SAN output with that of the corresponding
original face image, as opposed to the input to the SAN
model (which is already perturbed for i ≥ 2). This is to
ensure that the matching performance does not substan-
tially decline as the sequence is expanded. Furthermore,
we considered three different scenarios for the pixelwise
dissimilarity loss:
1) Omitting the pixelwise dissimilarity loss term;
2) pixelwise dissimilarity with respect to the input, i.e.,
I ′i−1 for SANi;
3) pixelwise dissimilarity loss with respect to the orig-
inal image Iorig for each of SAN models i = 1, ..., n.
We evaluated all three different pixelwise loss function
schemes listed above. However, we were unable to observe
any noticeable differences except for some cases where the
third scheme slightly outperformed the other two. There-
fore, we only report the results of the third case in this paper.
The training procedure is illustrated in Fig. 5.
Evaluating the FlowSAN Model
During the model evaluation, the auxiliary networks (the
auxiliary gender classifiers and auxiliary face matchers)
from the individual SANs are discarded, and the n SAN
models are stacked in the same sequence they were trained,
in order to enhance their generalizability to arbitrary gender
classifiers. In the FlowSAN model, the first SAN model
(SAN1) takes an original image (Iorig) as input and generates
a perturbed output image I ′1. This output image is then
passed into the next SAN model in the sequence to obtain
I ′2, and so forth. In general, the ith SAN model (SANi for
i = 2, ..., n) takes the output of the previous SAN model
(I ′i−1) as input and generates the perturbed output I
′
i .
4 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We designed two different protocols for training n SAN
models:
(a) Training an ensemble of SANs independent of
each other as described in [45] (see Section 3.1);
(b) Training the FlowSAN model using the sequen-
tial procedure described in Section 3.2.
Protocol (a) was adapted from [45] and is further de-
scribed in Section 3.1. For evaluating models trained in the
ensemble, we applied two techniques: 1) taking the average
output from SAN models which we denote as Ens-Avg, and
2) randomly selecting the output which we denote as Ens-
Gibbs. In addition, similar to [45], we also define the oracle
best-perturbed sample for a specific gender classifier, G:
best(I; E , G) =

arg min
SANi∈E
G(SANi(I)) if y = 1,
arg max
SANi∈E
G(SANi(I)), otherwise.
(8)
The results of best-perturbed samples are denoted as Ens-
Best. This analysis indicates which output from the ensem-
ble model E has resulted in the highest prediction error for
a particular gender classifier G if the best output is selected.
The training of the FlowSAN model was initiated from
the pre-trained individual SAN models in [45] and then
trained for 10 additional epochs on the CelebA-train sub-
set [49] (see Table 2) using the training procedure de-
scribed in Section 3.2. Then, the models were stacked succes-
sively to generate a sequence of perturbed output images,
〈I ′1, . . . , I ′n〉.
As the FlowSAN model conceals the gender informa-
tion in face images incrementally, it naturally produces a
sequence of perturbed face images, where the length of this
sequence is determined by its ensemble size. By varying the
size of the ensemble, we can have a fair comparison between
the ensemble approach vs. the FlowSAN model, such that
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Fig. 5. An illustration of a FlowSAN model: n SAN models are trained sequentially using n auxiliary gender classifiers (G = {G1, G2, ..., Gn}), and
a face matcher M that computes face representation vectors for both input image I and the output of SAN model. Both auxiliary face matcher and
the dissimilarity unit (D) use the original image along with the output of their corresponding SAN.
TABLE 2
Overview of datasets used in this study. The letters in the “Usage”
column indicate the tasks for which the datasets were used. a: training
auxiliary gender classifiers, b: SAN training, c: SAN evaluation, d:
constructing unseen gender classifiers used for evaluating SAN
models.
Dataset #male #female Usage
CelebA-train 73,549 103,772 a, b
CelebA-test 7,929 11,511 c
MORPH-train 41,587 7,567 d
MORPH-test 4,643 863 c
LFW 10,064 2,905 d
MUCT 1,844 1,910 c
RaFD 1,008 600 c
the number of SANs used to obtain an output from the
ensemble model is consistent with the number of SANs that
are used to generate the output from the FlowSAN model.
For model evaluation and comparison, we used four test
datasets: CelebA-test [49], MORPH-test [52], MUCT [53],
and RaFD [54]. The number of male and female individuals
in each dataset is listed in Table 2.
4.1 Performance in Confounding Unseen Gender Clas-
sifiers
In order to evaluate the generalization performance of the
three ensemble-based methods discussed in the previous
section (Ens-Avg, Ens-Gibbs, Ens-Best) as well as the pro-
posed FlowSAN model, we considered six independent
gender classifiers. The experiments designed in this section
assess how well the proposed models are able to confound
gender classifiers that were unseen during training. These
six gender classifiers include three models that were al-
ready trained: a commercial-of-the-shelf gender classifier
(G-COTS), IntraFace [55], AFFACT [56], and three CNN
models built in-house, which we refer to as CNN-1, CNN-
2 (trained using MORPH-train and LFW, respectively), and
CNN-3 (trained on the union of MORPH-train and LFW).
Note that these three CNN models have shown a similar
level of performance on the original test-sets, compared to
the other three pre-trained gender predictors.
Fig. 6 shows the area under the ROC curve as a perfor-
mance metric for evaluating the generalization performance
of each unseen gender classifier on the four independent
test datasets. The performance of these gender classifiers on
the original images (before perturbations), as well as the
outputs from the mixing approach by [23], is also shown for
comparison.
In all cases, the FlowSAN approach results in lower AUC
values (lower is better) of predictions made by unseen gen-
der classifiers (Fig. 6) compared to the ensemble models Ens-
Avg and Ens-Gibbs. In fact, the results of the stacking SAN
models are almost on par with the oracle best-perturbed
samples (Ens-Best) for each gender classifier. In some cases,
the FlowSAN model even outperforms Ens-Best. It is impor-
tant to note that selecting the best-perturbed sample (from
the individual SAN models) for each gender classifier
without a priori knowledge of the classifier is infeasible
in practice. Yet, we are able to outperform the best result
using the FlowSAN model in several cases.
Note that in a real privacy application, reaching a
near random gender prediction performance (AUC ≈ 0.5,
and Equal Error Rate (EER) ≈ 0.5) is desired for gender
anonymization. As it can be seen in Fig. 6, both Ens-Avg and
Ens-Gibbs methods produce samples that are mostly inca-
pable of lowering the AUC of the unseen gender classifiers
below 0.75 AUC. Based on the results shown in Fig. 6 (and
the EER results shown in Fig. S1), it is evident that, in the
majority of cases, a sequential stacking of three SAN mod-
els via FlowSAN produces the desired behavior in terms
of face gender-anonymization, i.e., AUC ≈ 0.5 (similarly,
EER ≈ 0.5). Although, in some cases, the 5th output from
Ens-Avg and Ens-Gibbs resulted in a low, desired AUC of
≈ 0.5, it also has a substantially detrimental effect on the
face matching performance, as discussed in Section 4.2.
As a result, we conclude that stacking three SAN models
in FlowSAN is sufficient to achieve the best gender label
anonymization performance across a set of different, unseen
gender classifiers and face image datasets. Stacking fewer
than three models affects unseen gender classifiers substan-
tially less, and stacking more than three models induces
such strong perturbations that flipping the predicted labels
could again de-anonymize the perturbed face images with
respect to their gender labels.
We shall note that our study was not the first to con-
found gender classifiers to produce random predictions. In
[23], researchers proposed a face mixing approach that also
leads to successful gender anonymization (approximately
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Fig. 6. Area under the ROC curve (AUC) measured for the six unseen gender classifiers (CNN-3, CNN-2, CNN-1, AFFACT, IntraFace, and G-
COTS) on the test partitions of the four different datasets (CelebA, MORPH, MUCT, and RaFD). The gender classification performance on the
original images (”Orig.”) is shown (blue dashed line) as well as the perturbed samples using the three ensemble-based models (Ens-Avg, Ens-
Gibbs, Ens-Best) the proposed FlowSAN model, and the face mixing approach [23] (gray dashed line). The index (1, 2, ..., 5) on the x-axis indicates
the sequence of outputs 〈I′1, I′2, ..., I′5〉 obtained by varying the ensemble size, n. In almost all cases, stacking three SAN models results in an AUC
of approximately 0.5 (a perfectly random gender prediction).
80.5 AUC gender prediction performance for a specific gen-
der classifier); however, this approach was unable to retain
the face matching utility. In different studies, the researchers
were able to retain face matching utility but without gen-
eralizing to arbitrary gender classifiers [9], [24]. Thus, the
FlowSAN model we propose in this paper presents the
first successful approach for satisfying both objectives: con-
cealing gender information and retaining matching perfor-
mance to a satisfactory degree across a variety of indepen-
dent gender classifiers and face matchers.
4.2 Retaining the Performance of Unseen Face Match-
ers
To assess the effect of the gender perturbations on the
matching accuracy, we considered four different unseen
face matchers. This includes a commercial-of-the-shelf face
matcher (M-COTS), which has shown state-of-the-art perfor-
mance in face recognition, as well as three publicly available
algorithms that provide face representation vectors: DR-
GAN [57], FaceNet [58], and OpenFace [59]. For the latter
three models, we measured the cosine similarity between
face representation vectors obtained from the original im-
ages and face representation vectors obtained from the SAN-
perturbed output images.
Fig. 8 shows the True Match Rate (TMR) values at False
Match Rate (FMR) of 0.1% for different ensemble methods.
In most cases, the performance of the face matchers regard-
ing the first three outputs (I ′1, I
′
2, and I
′
3) is similar and
relatively close to the matching performance on original
images. We note that stacking three SANs in FlowSAN
yields the desired performance with regard to confounding
unseen gender classifiers. Therefore, the evaluation of the
face matching performance for stacking more than three
SANs I ′3 (i.e., I
′
4 and I
′
5) is only included for completeness.
Comparing the performance of face matchers for equal
values of n, we observe that the face matchers appear to
perform slightly better on outputs produced by the ensem-
ble model compared to the FlowSAN model. However, the
extent to which the gender classification performance is
reduced by the two models is not the same for equal values
of n (Table 3). The ensemble model requires at least n = 5 in-
dividual SAN models to be able to confound unseen gender
classifiers to reach the same level of gender anonymization
as the FlowSAN model with n = 3. Therefore, if we compare
the ensemble models with n = 5 to the FlowSAN model
with n = 3, the face matchers perform substantially better
on the face image outputs by the FlowSAN model (Fig. 8).
Further, note that the performance of M-COTS on CelebA
on the original images is already as low as 85.6%. In fact, all
matchers perform poorly on the CelebA dataset, which may
be due to different face orientations captured in the wild.
Preserving Privacy
The overall average performance considering the two target
objectives of this study, i.e., confounding gender classifiers
and retaining the matching utility of face images, is pro-
vided in Table 3. In this analysis, the average EER results
of all six gender classifiers over all four evaluation datasets
were computed for original images, outputs from Ref. [23],
as well as outputs from the stacking and the ensemble
models using n = 3 and n = 5. The results clearly show
TABLE 3
Comparing the overall average performance of six unseen gender
classifiers and four unseen face matchers over the four evaluation
datasets using n = 3 or n = 5 SAN models. This shows that stacking 3
SAN models results in gender anonymization EER ≈ 0.5, while the the
average matching performance is still comparable to the unmodified
images as well as the matching performance on the outputs form other
existing methods.
Gender: Matching:
EER TMR atFMR=0.1%
Orig. 10% 76.3%
Ref [23] 46% 9.1%
n = 3 n = 5 n = 3 n = 5
Ens-Avg 23% 40% 64.9% 48.1%
Ens-Gibbs 29% 31% 65.2% 65.6%
Ens-Best 48% 57% – –
FlowSAN 49% 64% 61.9% 35.4%
that the FlowSAN model outperforms the ensemble-based
methods, including the oracle-best results. On the other
hand, the average true matching rate (TMR) values, at a false
matching rate (FMR) of 0.1%, are also computed similarly,
and the results indicate that the Ens-Gibbs method has
the highest performance for both ensemble sizes, while the
performance of the FlowSAN model at n = 3 is ranked as
second, but it is very close to that of Ens-Gibbs. The detailed
EER results for each gender classifier is provided in Table S1.
Computational Efficiency
The overall computational cost for training the ensemble-
based approach and the FlowSAN model is similar, except
that FlowSAN requires an additional data transformation
step between each consecutive SAN training. However, the
ensemble approach comes with a bigger advantage that the
individual SAN models can be trained in parallel, while
the SAN models in the FlowSAN model have to be trained
sequentially.
5 CONCLUSION
In this work, we address one of the main limitations of
previous gender privacy methods, namely, their inability to
generalize across multiple previously unseen gender clas-
sifiers. In this regard, we propose the FlowSAN method
that sequentially combines diverse perturbations for an
input face image to confound the gender information with
respect to an arbitrary gender classifier. We compared the
performance of the proposed FlowSAN model with two
ensemble-based approaches: 1) using the average output of
SAN models trained independent of each other (Ens-Avg);
2) randomly selecting the output from the SAN models in
the ensemble (Ens-Gibbs).
Our experiments show that the FlowSAN method out-
performs the other ensemble-based approaches in terms
of confounding gender attribute for a range of gender
classifiers. More importantly, while gender classification is
successfully confounded, face matching accuracy is retained
for all perturbed output face images, thereby preserving the
biometric utility of the gender-anonymous face images.
9Fig. 7. A randomly selected set of examples showing input face images and their outputs from I′1 to I
′
5 using (A) the ensemble model, Ens-Avg, and
(F) using the FlowSAN model.
While this work only focused on confounding gen-
der labels to demonstrate this method’s efficacy in hiding
soft-biometric attributes, our method can be readily ex-
tended and generalized to incorporate other soft-biometric
attributes (for example, age and ethnicity), which is subject
of future studies.
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Fig. S1. Equal Error Rate (EER) measured for the six unseen gender classifiers (CNN-3, CNN-2, CNN-1, AFFACT, IntraFace, and G-COTS) on the
test partitions of the four different datasets (CelebA, MORPH, MUCT, and RaFD). The gender classification performance on the original images
(”Orig.”) is shown (blue dashed line) as well as the perturbed samples using the three ensemble models (Ens-Avg, Ens-Gibbs, Ens-Best), the
proposed FlowSAN model, and the face mixing approach [23] (gray dashed line). The index (1, 2, ..., 5) on the x-axis indicates the sequence of
outputs 〈I′1, I′2, ..., I′5〉 obtained by varying the ensemble size, n.
14
TABLE S1
Comparing the overall average Equal Error Rate (EER) of six unseen gender classifiers averaged over all four evaluation datasets (CelebA-test,
MORPH-test, MUCT, and RaFD), higher is better. Note that the Ens-Best method is the result of “oracle best” selected classifier from an ensemble
of multiple SANs, which assumes knowledge of the gender classifier. While this is impractical in a real-world privacy application, we show the
results for comparison purposes.
Gender Orig. Ref. [23] n = 3 n = 5Classifier Ens-Avg Ens-Gibbs Ens-Best FlowSAN Ens-Avg Ens-Gibbs Ens-Best FlowSAN
G-COTS 0.13 0.48 0.05 0.18 0.30 0.40 0.17 0.18 0.35 0.71
IntraFace 0.10 0.46 0.23 0.38 0.61 0.65 0.47 0.41 0.71 0.80
AFFACT 0.09 0.46 0.26 0.28 0.44 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.58 0.45
CNN-1 0.10 0.46 0.38 0.36 0.62 0.53 0.55 0.38 0.74 0.75
CNN-2 0.12 0.47 0.23 0.23 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.25 0.38 0.59
CNN-3 0.05 0.46 0.23 0.30 0.53 0.51 0.39 0.32 0.65 0.57
Average 0.10 0.46 0.23 0.29 0.48 0.49 0.40 0.31 0.57 0.64
